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I. Introduction
A. Background
The War on Terror, known formally today as 
the War Against Al Qaeda and its Affiliates, premised 
on upholding the values of freedom, integrity, and 
democracy, has been tarnished by some of the most 
abhorrent practices known to humankind. Among 
such practices, torture remains at the forefront. While 
numerous states continue to practice torture despite 
their international obligations, nothing has been so 
shocking, so damning, so alarming in the struggle 
to eradicate torture than the graphic images of U.S. 
run prisons and accounts provided by their detainees. 
While we live in an era of the germinating phase of 
ostensibly a “new” form of war-making where it is 
unclear whether the laws of war apply, the fact that 
the leading state of the free world has been able to 
carry out tortuous practices contradicts the very 
notion of a “war on terror.” For example, the U.S. 
military had approved, among other forms of torture, 
hooding, sleep deprivation, use of dogs, sensory 
deprivation, nudity, and the placement of prisoners in 
painful positions for extended periods.2 Prisoners also 
complained in domestic federal court that American 
soldiers had caused them severe physical pain that 
sometimes resulted in permanent physical injury.3 
Indeed, as one anonymous U.S. official stationed in 
Afghanistan stated, if “you don’t violate someone’s 
human rights some of the time, you probably aren’t 
doing your job.”4 Torture has been prevalent not 
only at detention centers in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
but also in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba where, according 
to a 2003 report by the International Committee of 
the Red Cross (“ICRC”), psychological and physical 
coercion “tantamount to torture” was used on 
prisoners.5 Perhaps most controversially, the Central 
Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) has also admitted to its use 
of the internationally banned practice of waterboarding.6 
Rather than carrying out such activities in secret, the 
United States crafted a painstakingly detailed account of 
the law in the early stages of the conflict and used legal 
acrobatics to overcome the barriers preventing torture. 
The product of such efforts, known as the “torture 
memos,”7 will be addressed throughout this paper. The 
torture memos are a set of three legal memoranda drafted 
by John Yoo in his position as Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General of the United States, and signed by Assistant 
Attorney General Jay S. Bybee, head of the Office of 
Legal Counsel of the United States Department of 
Justice. They advised the presidential administration 
that the use of “enhanced interrogation techniques” such 
as mental and physical torment and coercion, including 
prolonged sleep deprivation, binding in stress positions, 
and waterboarding might be legally permissible.8 
These memos formed the backbone of the U.S. policy 
regarding interrogations during the Bush era. The 
United Nations Convention Against Torture, and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(“UN CAT”) and the Geneva Conventions stand out 
among the barriers these memos sought to overcome. 
Unlike the UN CAT, the language used in the Geneva 
Conventions emphasizes an absolute prohibition on 
physical pain. However, the Geneva Conventions apply 
solely in situations of armed conflicts. For this reason, 
to evade scrutiny through the lens of the Conventions, 
the U.S. attempted to categorize the conflict as falling 
outside both international armed conflicts (“IACs”) 
and non-international armed conflicts (NIACs), thus 
precluding the application of Geneva law.
While much of the legal framework used to 
justify torture within the United States is no longer 
considered part of U.S. policy and the United States has 
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since abandoned the practice of torture,9 there is still 
merit in analyzing these policies as there are no safeguards 
against a return to a torture regime, nor any recognition 
that the “enhanced interrogation”10 used by the United 
States during the past decade violated international 
law.11 The War on Terror does not fit “neatly” within 
the traditional types of armed conflict. Moreover, the 
Secretary of Defense continues to hold the power to, if 
he or she pleases, introduce evidence obtained through 
torture in courts of law.12 This paper considers the 
scope of international law in regulating non-traditional, 
asymmetrical warfare and attempts to clarify the 
misperceptions regarding application of international 
legal instruments prohibiting torture to these conflicts.
B. Framework
While the era of torture seemingly ended with the 
Bush Administration, it is clear that, without a fundamental 
shift in the way that conflict is conceptualized, the existing 
legal framework remains insufficient to prevent a future 
American torture regime. The primary reasons for this are 
the misunderstanding of the application of human rights 
law during armed conflict and the misconceptualization 
of the Geneva Conventions. To adequately preclude the 
use of any form of torture during conflict, four important 
statements regarding warfare and derived from customary 
international law must be asserted. First, international 
human rights law (“IHRL”) must apply co-extensively 
with international humanitarian law (“IHL”) during 
armed conflicts. Second, war must exist within the 
confines of temporal and spatial boundaries at all times. 
Third, transnational actors including terrorist groups 
may not be considered combatants outside of traditional 
armed conflicts, Finally, within armed conflict, there is 
no detainee “twilight zone” in the Geneva Conventions. 
The adoption of these maxims offers greater permanence 
than does the change in policy from one presidential 
administration to the next.
This paper is divided into six parts. Part II 
will consider the applicability of international human 
rights law instruments during warfare, particularly the 
United Nations Convention Against Torture. Part III 
will demonstrate how political rhetoric has been used to 
eradicate the temporal boundary of war. Warfare requires 
the existence of a possible end-point, and the dissolution 
of this end-point antagonizes compliance with Geneva 
Law. Part IV argues that the supposed non-existence of 
spatial boundaries during warfare, an argument crafted 
by U.S. legal rhetoric, is incorrect. A correct geographical 
framework of the Law of Armed Conflict will be put 
forward, and outside of these boundaries, terrorism must 
be neutralized through law enforcement. From this, Part V 
notes that transnational terrorist organizations can never, 
independent of other conflicts, be considered belligerent 
forces with which a state may wage war for the purposes 
of the Geneva Conventions. Finally, part VI argues that 
there is no twilight zone in conflicts. Thus, individuals 
who are detained receive protection under either the Third 
or Fourth Geneva Convention and, ipso facto, always retain 
protection from torture. This paper makes the following 
overall conclusions: that (1) IHRL is co-extensive with IHL, 
but is limited through the principle of military necessity; (2) 
states must adhere to the temporal and spatial boundaries 
of war, and avoid using rhetoric to derogate human rights; 
(3) terrorists are never lawful combatants, and are only 
unlawful combatant when directly participating in active 
theaters of traditional wars; and (4) those persons within 
such an armed conflict that do not qualify for POW status 
must still be treated humanely in accordance with the 
Third Geneva Convention.
II. The UN Convention Against Torture and its 
Relationship to the Geneva Conventions
The United States has put forward two 
arguments for finding that the UN CAT does not 
apply during the War against Al Qaeda and its 
affiliates. While this paper focuses predominantly on 
the armed conflict paradigm, some discussion will 
be dedicated to the UN CAT specifically because 
this paper finds the UN CAT applies during armed 
conflict situations as well, and thus the UN CAT is 
therefore relevant to the present discussion. The UN 
CAT is applicable to the prevention of torture in the 
context of war because (1) the definition of torture 
is not narrow enough to bar the US’s application of 
physical abuse and (2) international human rights law 
is co-extensive with the law of armed conflict; the two 
sources of law are not mutually exclusive.
A. The Scope of “severe pain or suffering”
From the very start of the War on Terror, the 
term “torture,” as applied in the UN CAT, was quickly 
redefined by Department of Defense lawyers to read 
the use of torture out of the law.13 While the UN CAT 
addresses both torture and inhumane or degrading 
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treatment, only torture is punishable.14 Consequently, 
the U.S. has a strategic interest in narrowing the 
scope of the convention so that it can engage in acts 
that are otherwise generally understood to be torture. 
Controversially, the torture memos found that to inflict 
torture, physical pain “must be equivalent in intensity 
to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such 
as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even 
death.”15 While these memos were eventually superseded, 
policy changes were based only on domestic, rather than 
international law.16 Such a shocking interpretation of 
the law is possible only because the definition of torture 
found within the UN CAT is not as strong as the 
language used in the Third Geneva Conventions – which 
allows no physical pain at all.17 The UN CAT defines 
torture as “any act by which severe pain or suffering, 
whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on 
a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a 
third person information or a confession.”18 However, 
reading the language in such a narrow fashion confines 
torture to only sadistic acts or deprivations, a reading 
some have found to be incompatible with the purpose 
of preventing torture.19 The torture memos stated that 
the United States and the United Kingdom proposed 
stronger language.20 However, they fail to note that a 
majority of states rejected strengthening the language.21
Moreover, outside of armed conflict and 
within the law enforcement paradigm, other important 
limitations make up for, or otherwise limit, the use of 
physical force far in advance the preposterous levels 
suggested by the drafters of the torture memos. For 
example, according to the Eighth United Nations 
Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment 
of Offenders, “[w]henever the lawful use of force . . 
. is unavoidable, law enforcement officials shall (a) 
Exercise restraint in such use and act in proportion 
to the seriousness of the offence and the legitimate 
objective to be achieved; (b) Minimize damage and 
injury, and respect and preserve human life; (c) Ensure 
that assistance and medical aid are rendered to any 
injured or affected persons at the earliest possible 
moment.”22 The reasoning behind the use of the term 
“severe” is far more comprehensible within the context 
of law enforcement; of course law enforcement should 
be allowed to use some physical force in detaining 
or apprehending suspects and a bright-line rule 
against any physical force would be detrimental to 
law enforcement efforts – even within the context of 
interrogations. Within the context of armed conflict, 
however, this same type of reasoning does not hold.
The practices used by the United States, including 
several forms of deprivation, are nowhere found to be 
legal in the travaux préparatoire of the UN CAT.23 Indeed, 
in the Greek Case, which some commentators hold was 
one of the main inspiration for the definition of torture 
under Article One of the Convention,24 the court found 
that “the failure of the Government of Greece to provide 
food, water, heating in winter, proper washing facilities, 
clothing, medical and dental care to prisoners constitutes 
an ‘act’ of torture . . . .”25 The UN Commission Against 
Torture has also often made specific findings of torture in 
situations that did not include “severe” physical pain as 
defined by the United States, but included factors such as 
long hours of isolation, inadequate ventilation, cramped 
rooms, and no light.26 It is under the backdrop of this 
jurisprudence that the findings of the torture memos 
become so shocking. For these reasons, the US is bound 
not only by domestic law, but also by international law 
and custom, to ensure that during armed conflict no form 
of torture is administered to detainees.
B. The Applicability of International Human 
Rights Law During Armed Conflict
The United States has argued that the UN 
CAT does not apply during a situation of armed conflict, 
because during a time of conflict, the law of war supersedes 
international human rights law. According to the 
Committee Against Torture, the United States has argued 
that the law of armed conflict is the exclusive applicable 
law.27 The Committee Against Torture has responded to 
this argument by noting that the Convention applies at 
all times, whether in peace, war, or armed conflict, in any 
territory under its jurisdiction, and that the application 
of the Convention’s provisions are without prejudice. The 
Committee points to the wording of the Convention, 
which stated that “[t]he provisions of this Convention 
are without prejudice to the provisions of any other 
international instrument or national law which prohibits 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of 
which relates to extradition or expulsion.”28
The notion that human rights law, and thus the 
UN CAT, apply during armed conflict is not novel. In its 
2004 Legal Consequences on the Construction of a Wall in 
the Occupied Palestinian Territory advisory opinion, the 
International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) found that IHL 
and IHRL are co-extensive. In the words of the Court:
[T]he protection offered by human 
rights conventions does not cease in 
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case of armed conflict . . . . As regards 
the relationship between international 
humanitarian law and human rights 
law, there are thus three possible situ-
ations: some rights may be exclusively 
matters of international humanitarian 
law; others may be exclusively matters 
of human rights law; yet others may 
be matters of both these branches of 
international law.29
Thus, IHRL does not automatically cease to 
be law as soon as armed conflict erupts. The question 
of when a situation may be governed exclusively by 
IHRL remains to be determined.
Some commentators have argued that 
during an armed conflict, IHRL simply acts as a 
sort of “benchmark” to IHL.30 However, this line of 
reasoning does not incorporate the distinctly tripartite 
test set out by the ICJ, generally considered to have 
been established under customary conceptions of 
international law.31 The analysis of when IHL applies, 
rather, should be founded on the application of IHL 
itself since it is the lex specialis.32
IHL and the use of force are guided almost 
exclusively by the fundamental principles of warfare. 
The first and founding principle is the principle of 
military necessity. Military necessity requires states to 
confine the use of force to military objectives only. It 
was codified in the preamble to the Saint-Petersburg 
declaration, which stated that “the only legitimate 
object which States should endeavor to accomplish 
during war is to weaken the military forces of the 
enemy.”33 Christopher Greenwood, the British judge 
of the ICJ, defines military necessity, in part, as a 
belligerent applying “only that amount and kind 
of force necessary to defeat the enemy.”34 In short, 
military necessity is the only justification that may 
abrogate human rights. The other three fundamental 
principles, those of distinction, proportionality, and 
humanity, act as a counter-balance to the principle of 
military necessity.35 A state should only deviate from 
IHRL when permitted by the principle of military 
necessity. For example, the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) guarantees the 
right to life and freedom from the arbitrary deprivation 
of life.36 Despite this, states are undoubtedly allowed 
to kill combatants during warfare. Moreover, as long 
as the principles of distinction, proportionality, and 
humanity have been adhered to, a state may also 
legally deprive civilians of their lives (as, for example, 
collateral damage in a drone strike). Thus, it is this type 
of calculus with which foreign policy attorneys must 
engage in order to determine when a treaty, particularly 
one as important as the UN CAT, may be abrogated.
In the War on Terror, it seems entirely unlikely 
that that the requirements of military necessity would 
allow for the derogation of the freedom from torture 
provided by the UN CAT. While part of the torture 
memos’ argument is loosely based on the requirements 
of necessity,37 this is regular necessity, related not to 
military objectives, but to the protection of civilians. 
Furthermore, even if there was some sort of military 
necessity, the abrogation of the freedom from torture 
cannot withstand the principle of humanity, which 
finds that the ability of states to injure the enemy is 
“not unlimited” and that states are prohibited from 
“employ[ing] arms, projectiles, or material calculated 
to cause unnecessary suffering.”38 Torture is always 
unnecessary because it does not weaken enemy 
forces nor constitute the force necessary to defeat the 
enemy. Additionally, the suffering caused by torture 
is immense. As one commentator explained, “pain is 
just a useful method [during torture] for reducing the 
individual to nothing more than a physical body; a 
self that cannot make rational decisions or have any 
concept of its own personality and individuality.”39 It 
is for this reason that torture is viewed by almost all 
states40 as a particularly serious offense that cannot be 
justified by military necessity. Since the two sources of 
international law are clearly co-extensive, and the law 
of armed conflict under the principles of IHL do not 
allow for the derogation of the general law in regards to 
torture, the UN CAT applies during armed conflicts.
III. Armed Conflicts: Temporal Boundaries & 
Political Rhetoric
A. Historical Significance of Temporal Boundaries 
of Warfare
A temporal limitation on warfare is of 
paramount importance for the law of war should never 
obscure or obfuscate lex generalis, the law of peacetime, 
during which no partial revocation of human rights is 
permitted. Historically, the concept of spatial limitations 
to warfare was taken for granted; war was always 
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considered to have been temporally limited. Thus, the 
wording of the Third Geneva Convention states that 
detainees may be detained for as long as hostilities are 
ongoing.41 The law of war is premised on compromise 
and based on the notion that the fundamental human 
rights of peacetime cannot be preserved during war. 
It is the “special law” because it is well understood 
that placing limits on warfare such as the prohibition 
of killing would make the law unworkable. Thus, to 
preserve international human rights law, the law of 
war is allowed, within specific temporal constraints, 
to derogate human rights for the purposes of waging 
war. By dissolving the temporal boundary, however, we 
allow the law of war to creep into the law of peacetime, 
gradually dissolving fundamental rights.
This is precisely what has begun to occur 
with the War on Terror targeting Al Qaeda and its 
affiliates.42 The judicial branch of the United States 
has consistently found that the War on Terror may be 
not limited in a temporal way. For example, in Hamdi 
v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court refused to establish 
temporal parameters for the conflict.43 In Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, the Court maintained that position.44 In 
Justice Thomas’ dissent, he affirmed that the Court 
should not and would not use time as a limiting 
factor in assessing the scope of the conflict.45 These 
decisions were made in the context of determining 
whether or not detainees could be held indefinitely 
(since detention is permitted only until the end of 
hostilities). However, there is a more sinister effect 
to the avoidance of a temporal limitation on warfare: 
the dissolution of the temporal boundary of warfare, 
combined with wartime rhetoric, has allowed the 
executive branch to gain substantial latitude in using 
force and diminish international human rights.
B. Political Rhetoric as a Weapon
In understanding how political rhetoric has 
transformed, among other elements though perhaps 
most saliently, the temporal boundary of warfare, we 
must first turn to a general discussion on political 
rhetoric. As one commentator correctly questioned, 
“who is the enemy? If it is Al-Qaeda, how do we 
identify a member of Al-Qaeda? Where does Al-Qaeda 
operate? Do any sort of borders in fact confine Al-
Qaeda? Are its self-professed affiliates also enemies?”46 
However, we must first ask the question “why don’t 
we care?” Why hasn’t there been a bigger backlash 
that would first attempt to define any of these terms 
before sliding into an endless war paradigm? Political 
rhetoric is, in large part, the answer to that question.47 
Some of the more ardent detractors of the use of 
political rhetoric to define warfare have categorized 
political rhetoric as a form of terrorism that targets 
civilians, generates fear, and causes political change.48
Terrorism is merely a term used to describe 
a small subset of actions that fall within the larger 
category of political violence.49 For political actors, 
terrorism could be used to define and condemn any 
actions of the enemy.50 It does not end with any 
person, idea, or thing. Indeed, as initially defined 
by Donald Rumsfeld, the US was at war with 
“terrorism’s attack on our way of life.”51 The torture 
memos, discussed in Section II, supra, often turned to 
political rhetoric to justify many of their outlandish 
claims regarding torture, scrupulously ensuring to “at 
the outset, make clear the nature of the threat posed 
. . . . ”52 Even though the present administration has 
moved away from defining terror itself as the enemy,53 
the notion that the United States is fighting terrorism 
everywhere lingers. Declaring a war on a concept that 
is too vague to be meaningful allows policy makers to 
justify any global military activity.54 Its real effect is to 
transform lex specialis into lex generalis. Armed with 
this understanding of the power of political rhetoric, 
it is easy to see how political rhetoric has changed the 
temporal conception of warfare.
C. Political Rhetoric and the Dissolution of Time
The United States’ fixation with fighting 
terrorism everywhere has led to the destruction of the 
temporal element of warfare. This destruction, in turn, 
has contributed to the abandonment of fundamental 
guarantees of warfare found in the Geneva Conventions, 
including freedom from torture. According to the 
Third Geneva Convention, those detained by war are 
to be tried for war crimes or released at the cessation 
of hostilities “without delay.”55 Today, the guarantee 
against indefinite detention is a jus cogens56 violation 
of international law. The frequent violation of such 
a guarantee contributes to the overall denigration of 
detainees and is in this manner a foundation for other 
violations, including torture. According to one scholar, 
in the absence of traditional evaluations of warfare, 
citizens “look to the leader for evaluation.”57 This is 
because the erosion of clear temporal boundaries leads 
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to a slippery slope that blurs the lines between war and 
peace and obfuscates what is and is not legal. As some 
commentators have concluded, this slippery slope 
allows those in power to blur even the areas of the law 
that remain relevant and clear, allowing war-makers 
to mystify war to the degree necessary to turn obvious 
legal conclusions – such as the prohibition of torture – 
into disarray.58
The deferral to the leadership by the citizenry 
is also of primary importance in stymieing resistance 
to objectionable conduct such as torture. This has 
become most salient, as noted earlier, in the judiciary’s 
constant deferral to the executive in determining the 
temporal boundaries or warfare. Phrased eloquently 
by George Orwell in his classic 1984, “war, however, 
is no longer the desperate, annihilating struggle that 
it was in the early decades of the 20th century. It is 
warfare of limited aims between combatants that are 
unable to destroy one another, have no material cause 
for fighting, and are not divided by any genuine 
ideological difference.”59 Indeed, unlimited war-
making, as found in Orwell’s dystopian society, is a 
terrifying interpretation of the war with no end being 
waged against Al Qaeda, its affiliates.
IV.  Armed Conflicts: Spatial Boundaries & Legal 
Rhetoric
A. U.S. Conceptualization of Space and War
The application of the Geneva Conventions 
must be fundamentally based in IHL. To sidestep the 
application of the Geneva Conventions, then, the U.S. 
primarily relies, rather calamitously, on a restricted 
concept of the law of war. The first paradigm the 
U.S. adopted was that there exists neither an IAC nor 
a NIAC between the United States and individuals 
belonging to Al Qaeda, but is still another sort of armed 
conflict exempt from the requirements of the Geneva 
Conventions.60 The U.S. Supreme Court eventually 
rejected the dubious interpretation that the war against 
Al Qaeda and its affiliates fell outside the purview of 
both NIACs and IACs and found the proposed legal 
justification that the war was a non-international 
conflict of international scope to be unsatisfying.61 This 
interpretation of international law is flawed because it 
ignores the fundamental importance of a geographical 
interpretation of the law.
The framework used to combat terrorism 
remains ambiguous today. Warfare has not traditionally 
had explicit limits founded in geography. While IHL 
does not explicitly delineate spatial boundaries to a 
conflict,62 Common Article 2 and Common Article 
3, governing the application of IACs and NIACs 
respectively, take a geographical approach to armed 
conflicts.63 For NIACs in particular, the reference to 
location is quite evidently stated. Common Article 3 
refers to conflict “occurring in the territory of one of 
the High Contracting Parties,”64 suggesting that the 
state in which the conflict takes place forms at least part 
of the geographic area of the conflict.65 IACs, however, 
have not traditionally been seen to be geographically 
limited; under IACs, wherever the enemy goes, “[a state 
is] entitled to follow and attack him as a combatant.”66 
However, an increasing number of advocates have 
theorized that the concept of a “global” armed conflict, 
even as it relates to IACs, runs contrary to international 
law.67 Christopher Greenwood , a former ICJ judge, 
stated that “it cannot be assumed – as in the past – that 
a state engaged in an armed conflict is free to attack its 
adversary anywhere in the area of war.”68 For example, 
while Harold Koh and John Brennan have referenced 
the targeted killing of Japanese General Yamamoto 
during World War II as a justification for worldwide 
targeted killings,69 some commentators have argued 
that even the U.S. shooting down of Yamamoto’s plane 
in World War II would today be illegal under IHL.70
While this notion is fiercely controversial,71 
the United States has also demonstrated some 
adherence to the importance of location in the use of 
force. Significant judicial decisions have recognized the 
principle distinction between areas falling within an 
active theater of war and those falling outside of this 
theater. Among them, in Al Maqaleh v. Gates, the Court 
of Appeals for the DC Circuit distinguished between 
Afghanistan, “a theater of active military combat,” and 
areas outside of Afghanistan, considered “far removed 
from any battlefield.”72 In Boumediene v. Bush, the US 
Supreme Court recognized the territory of the United 
States as not being within any “active theater of war.”73
B. Reinterpreting the Tadić Test
It is worth addressing, here, the Tadić armed 
conflict test. The Tadić test, crafted by the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
to determine when armed conflict exists, has been 
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embraced wholeheartedly by American policymakers for 
finding that the United States is engaged in a NIAC with 
Al Qaeda in which the bulk of the Geneva Conventions 
do not apply.74 The Tadić decision holds tremendous 
influence in determining where IHL applies.75 According 
to that opinion, “an armed conflict exists whenever there 
is a resort to armed force between States or protracted 
armed violence between governmental authorities and 
organized armed groups or between such groups within 
a State.”76 However, the Tadić factors, which consist of 
evaluating the intensity of the violence occurring as well 
as the organization of the forces,77 have often been used 
erroneously to argue that the United States is in a NIAC 
with Al Qaeda since Al Qaeda is an organized armed 
group fighting with significant intensity.78
Unfortunately, proponents of this mistaken 
characterization fail to read the following sentence 
of trial court’s decision, which stated that “in an 
armed conflict of an internal or mixed character, these 
closely related criteria are used solely for the purpose, 
as a minimum, of distinguishing an armed conflict 
from banditry . . . or terrorist activities, which are 
not subject to IHL.”79 Thus, not only do the Tadić 
factors apply exclusively in situations of internal or 
mixed character,80 but the trial court specifically severs 
terrorist activity from application of this test. Instead, 
the Tadić test must be construed geographically if it 
is to be understood correctly. Then, if the minimum 
threshold of violence that defines an armed conflict is 
satisfied, IHL should apply within that geographical 
area. This is because the test does not purport to allow 
a determination of the existence of a NIAC against 
a terror organization or any transnational actor, but 
an armed conflict within a confined geographical 
space, regardless of that organization’s extraterritorial 
affiliations. This interpretation is far more functional 
with the reality that, unlike the irregular forces and 
non-state actors noted in the Tadić decision, Al 
Qaeda and its affiliates can shift “unpredictably and 
irregularly between acts characteristic of wartime and 
those characteristic of not-wartime.”81
C. Subsuming Al Qaeda within Armed Conflict
This brings us to the obvious question of how, 
given the spatial requirement of warfare, the United 
States could ever be at war with a transnational actor. The 
simple answer is that it cannot, ever, be directly at war 
with a transnational actor. However, there are three ways 
in which the U.S. can be engaged, indirectly, in an armed 
conflict with Al Qaeda and other like organizations 
without dispensing of the spatial requirement. All 
three will be addressed, and a conclusion will be made 
regarding the application of the Geneva Conventions. 
First, states, through consent, internationalise an armed 
conflict by joining with a state to fight armed groups 
meeting the Tadić test within the consenting state. 
Second, states may, while already engaged in an armed 
conflict, attack or detain units in a neutral territory 
under certain conditions. Finally, a state may invoke self-
defense and attack a state-sponsor of terrorism.
War may be waged against ‘transnational’ 
actors by joining national (that is, non-international) 
armed conflicts. A state involved in a NIAC with an 
armed group can consent to the use of force within 
its territory by another state. Thus, if Pakistan was 
engaged in a NIAC with terror groups within Pakistan, 
the United States could lawfully be involved in the 
conflict though Pakistan’s consent.82 The consenting 
state is a necessary element of the existence of a NIAC 
given the phrase “internal or mixed” noted earlier, 
which logically makes “internal” a fundamental 
component of the test. This internationalizes the 
conflict, for the purposes of the Geneva Conventions, 
between the intervening state and the armed group.
Legally, the right to attack units within a ‘neutral’ 
territory arises only when that territory is unwilling or 
unable to neutralize belligerents. The offending state is 
thus no longer neutral, but “non-belligerent,” and the 
United States may violate that state’s sovereignty and 
perform the defensive actions the neutral state should 
have performed itself.83 However, this concept, codified 
in the Hague Convention V and adopted in 1907, 
was ratified in a time where states did not envision war 
against a transnational actor. Arguably, this preventive 
duty should not apply to transnational actors whose 
actions in the neutral state are more akin to a private 
person rather than leaders of a military operation, such 
as employing terror tactics rather than waging war.84 
Thus, it is more reasonable to find that the U.S. may 
invoke this principle only if it is at war with a state (such 
as Afghanistan) or in a NIAC within its own territory, 
since, again, there must be an internal component.
The intervening state may also invoke self-
defense to attack the host state (implying state-
sponsoring of terrorism) and target hostile enemies. 
The right to use force against the host state arises 
when “the state is tightly interwoven with or otherwise 
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exercises effective control over” an active group of 
enemies within the host state.85 This is inferred from 
the seminal Tadić Appeal Chamber “overall control” 
test.86 Several ICJ decisions have also found that 
the attacks of enemy groups must be attributable 
to a state for an attack on that state’s territory to be 
lawful. The ICJ has a different interpretation based 
on a stricter “effective control” test, which the Court 
used in several decisions. For example, in Dem. Rep. 
Congo v. Uganda,87 the ICJ found that Uganda could 
not justify the use of force in Congo given that 
Congo was not responsible for the attacks in Uganda 
of non-state actor groups.88 In the Oil Platforms 
case,89 the ICJ found that the US could not justify 
its acts against Iran as self-defense because it had 
not discharged its burden of proof to establish Iran’s 
responsibility for attacks against the United States.90 
In the Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary 
activities in and against Nicaragua,91 it found that the 
right to self-defense requires an armed attack by a 
state or attributable to a state by “the sending by or 
on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars 
or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force 
against another State of such gravity as to amount 
to (inter alia) an actual armed attack regular Armed 
Forces, or its substantial involvement therein.”92
Since the use of force is per se an acknowledgement 
of the existence of an armed conflict, the Geneva 
Conventions must apply at all times to those ‘combat 
zones’ in which individuals are killed or detained. Aside 
from three exceptions noted earlier, there are no other 
situations in which an armed conflict may arise between 
a transnational force and a state. Thus, the Conventions 
may not be regarded as optional or as a matter of ‘good 
policy’ and the United States must apply the Geneva 
Conventions within the geographical confines of combat 
zones at all times. As such, any person detained within 
a combat zone should be treated in accordance with the 
norms of the law of armed conflict, regardless of who 
they are. Of course, it is not always possible to determine 
who is a combatant and who is a civilian, whether they 
are engaged in hostilities or not. This dilemma will be 
addressed in the following section.
IV. Al Qaeda: Belligerency and POW Status
Even when captured in a foreign territory, 
members of Al Qaeda and its affiliates will virtually 
never qualify for POW status. It is important to 
distinguish between the concept of a combatant 
and the lawfulness of the combatant. Combatants 
are those individuals who participate in hostilities. 
Lawful combatants are those who fall under the 
combatant status designation of the Third Geneva 
Convention.93 Unlawful combatants are those who 
do not. In designating Al Qaeda and its affiliates as 
unlawful combatants, the United States, in its bid to 
deny POW status to these detainees, has focused far 
more on why Al Qaeda and its affiliates are unlawful 
rather than why they are combatants at all.94 This 
has contributed to notion of a ‘twilight zone’ in 
the Geneva Conventions discussed in Section VI, 
infra. The reality is that members of Al Qaeda, in 
the absence of any other belligerent force, are not 
combatants to begin with. There are two important 
reasons for the US to deny Al Qaeda and its affiliates 
the legal status required for POW treatment. First, 
it unnecessarily endangers the rights of civilians and 
exaggerates the scope of executive power. Second, it 
glorifies the status of those criminals themselves who 
are bestowed combatant status.
According to Article 4(a) of the Third Geneva 
Convention, only members of the armed forces of a party 
to the conflict as well as members of militias or volunteer 
corps forming part of such armed forces qualify for POW 
status.95 Members of other militias and volunteer corps, 
including those of organized resistance movements, 
belonging to a party to the conflict will only qualify if 
they have the following characteristics: (a) that of being 
commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates; 
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at 
a distance; (c) that of carrying arms openly; and (d) that 
of conducting their operations in accordance with the 
laws and customs of war.96 Al Qaeda and its affiliates, of 
course, do not satisfy these qualifications – they are not 
members of the armed forces of any state, nor do they 
have a fixed, distinctive sign or carry arms openly. They 
certainly do not conduct their operations in accordance 
with the laws and customs of war because Al Qaeda is a 
violent political organization that is not directly affiliated 
with any nation-state.97 Failing to qualify for combatant 
status means that they Al Qaeda’s members are not lawful 
combatants – and a war without any lawful combatants 
is, in reality, no war at all.
In situations of armed conflict, there is always a 
risk that civilians directly participate in hostilities (DPH). 
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It is these civilians who, for such time as they participate 
in hostilities, are considered unlawful combatants (and do 
not benefit from any combatant immunity).98 However, 
a situation involving civilians who DPH can only arise 
within the context of an already existing conflict – indeed, 
it would be an intolerable feature of warfare to find that 
a war can exist wherein one side of the conflict has no 
lawful combatants at all. The war against Al Qaeda and its 
affiliates is a war against civilians.
States have opposed broadening the scope 
of combatant status to include terrorists because of 
the risk it poses civilians. Indeed, while there are a 
limited number of international treaties dealing with 
terrorism, non-state actors are almost exclusively 
regulated under national law. The most important 
reason for not broadening the scope of combatant 
status is that it would unnecessarily obfuscate the 
distinction between civilians and combatants. In the 
1980s, President Ronald Reagan strongly opposed 
the provision of the First Additional Protocol to the 
Geneva Conventions which would have granted 
combatant status “to irregular forces even if they do 
not satisfy the traditional requirements” because “this 
would endanger civilians among whom terrorists 
and other irregular attempt to conceal themselves.”99 
Reagan, of course, spoke here of awarding combatant’s 
privilege, including POW status, and not being a 
combatant per se. However, the argument remains 
true regardless: civilian lives are certainly endangered 
by over-broadening the meaning of “combatant” 
to include terrorists who seek to blend in with the 
civilian population, regardless of the status they are 
awarded. Thus the United Kingdom understood the 
First Additional Protocol to mean that “the term 
‘armed conflict’ of itself and in its context denotes a 
situation of a kind which is not constituted by the 
commission of ordinary crimes including acts of 
terrorism whether concerted or in isolation.”100
While the U.S. has chosen to include 
terrorists as combatants in order to derogate their 
rights, many states have chosen to avoid calling 
terrorists combatants in order to delegitimize their 
actions. Many states, including Spain, Portugal, the 
United Kingdom, Indonesia, and Kenya, all use law 
enforcement to combat terror threats against their 
states. In fact, the United States, too, has traditionally 
used a law enforcement paradigm instead of resortint 
to armed conflict to combat terror and has employed 
this in response to attacks perpetrated by Al-Qaeda 
in 1993, 1998, and 2000.101 Politically, war has 
always meant a loss of control, while law enforcement 
displays a firm grip on control.102 This is not simply 
an act of political manipulation: while there are clear 
legal benefits to the failure to recognize the enemy 
as combatants, recognizing terrorists as combatants 
give unwarranted legitimacy to their actions. This 
notion has been well encapsulated by Christopher 
Greenwood. According to Greenwood,
[i]n the language of international law 
there is no legal basis for speaking of 
a war on Al-Qaeda or any other ter-
rorist group, for such a group cannot 
be a belligerent, it is merely a band of 
criminals, and to treat it as anything 
else risks distorting the law while giv-
ing that group a status which to some 
implies a degree of legitimacy.103
Indeed, terrorism must be de-legitimized and 
disassociated from lawful objectives. As Mary Ellen 
O’Connor argues, “fostering healthy states through the 
principle of non-intervention, the prohibition of force, 
respect for proportionality in the use of coercion, and 
promotion of human rights” through a global law-
enforcement effort would be a far better policy towards 
ending the threat of terrorism while still protecting 
basic human rights.104 The Eminent Jurist Panel on 
Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights 
echoed this view in a 2009 report,105 which argued that 
the current human rights legal framework is sufficiently 
adaptable to combat any current or future threat.106 
The report further concluded that even in the face of 
“unprecedented” threats, the risk of temporary measures 
becoming permanent, as well as the dissolution of 
fundamental human rights, are too high a cost for the 
derogation of human rights law to combat terrorism.107
V. The Myth of the Geneva Conventions’ 
Twilight Zone
A. Defining the Twilight Zone
Arising from the armed conflict paradigm is 
another significant problem: the myth of a “twilight zone” 
of the Geneva Conventions where those individuals 
detained are neither civilians nor combatants, thus 
making the Geneva Conventions inapplicable. Such a 
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problem can ostensibly arise in two situations: within 
an armed conflict against non-state actors (such as Al-
Qaeda) and in armed conflicts against state actors where 
non-state actors intervene as unlawful combatants (such 
as the war in Afghanistan and within the border areas 
of Pakistan). The former situation has already been 
dispensed with: there can be no war with Al Qaeda 
and its similar organizations for reasons of reasons of 
spatiality, temporality, and belligerency.108 The following 
section will thus deal with the latter situation.
The United States has made the assumption 
that, during an armed conflict, those captured who do 
not qualify for combatants’ privilege but who are still 
belligerents fall under a “twilight zone” of the law whereby 
neither IHRL nor the Geneva conventions apply to 
them. Moreover, US has argued that it is not bound by 
customary international law.109 Foremost, it should be 
noted that even unlawful combatants, under Geneva 
law, are given a fair trial and cannot be subjected to 
coercive interrogation.110 There are quasi-legal (political) 
arguments for the “twilight zone” status determination 
made by the United States as well as legal reasons.
The political rationale is simple – terrorists will 
not follow the rules laid out in the Geneva Conventions. 
Thus, the United States would be placed at a significant 
disadvantage if it had to follow these rules. International 
law, this argument goes, is based on rational self-interest. 
That is, states follow the rules of Geneva law based on 
the understanding that other states will do so as well. 
However, this argument is patently untrue, and may be 
dispensed with quickly because he Geneva Conventions 
do not have a “release clause” that relinquishes parties 
from following the law because the other side engages 
in illegal conduct (even if terrorists could be considered 
belligerents under the law).
B. ICTY Jurisprudence: A Comparison
The Geneva Conventions do, however, have 
a mechanism for determining the status of a detainee. 
Found in the Third Geneva Convention, this is known as 
a “status” or “Article 5” tribunal. These tribunals are meant 
to be a temporary legal forum for determining the status 
of an individual involved in a conflict. The ICTY has 
had to deal with such situations in the internationalized 
conflict of the Bosnian War. The Bosnian war was a 
non-international conflict between Bosnian Serbs and 
Bosniaks. Serbia and Croatia intervened in this conflict, 
thus internationalizing it, much like the United States 
would internationalize a conflict by joining a NIAC. 
In the context of the ICTY, based on a finding of 
an internationalized armed conflict,111 the court has 
been weary of finding individuals that do not clearly 
meet the requirements set forth in Article 4(a) of the 
Third Geneva Convention112 warranting combatant’s 
privilege in relation to their detention. In Deladic, the 
court recognized that categorization under Article 4(a) 
sets rather stringent requirements for the achievement 
of prisoner of war status, given it was drafted in light 
of the experience of World War II and reflects the 
conception of an international armed conflict current 
at that time. Thus, the various categories of persons 
who may be considered prisoners of war are narrowly 
framed.113 A detaining power is required, under Article 
5 of the Geneva Convention, to determine the status of 
the person being detained (in an “Article 5 tribunal”), 
and to impart on tat person the protections of the Third 
Geneva Convention until a determination is made.114
An analysis of how the ICTY has chosen to 
interpret customary international law in the context 
of war crimes provides some interesting insight on 
the understanding of customary law. Primarily, most 
detention centers where violations occurred during 
the Bosnian War were really “collection” centers and 
comprised of both civilians and true prisoners of war. 
This may indeed be similar to the American example. 
In the Sikirica et. al. sentencing judgment,115 the court 
found that investigations of the detaining power sought 
to establish which detainees had been involved in the 
fighting or where they came from and then categorize 
the detainees based on their answers.116 However, 
notwithstanding this procedure, the court still found 
all detainees to fall under the category of “civilians,” 
and based violations against them on the Fourth 
Geneva Convention, noting that the aforementioned 
method was an inadequate means of determining 
the status of detainees.117 The United States currently 
employs CSRTs (Combat Status Review Tribunals), 
but the adequacy of such review boards remains to be 
determined as they have yet to be legally tested.
The ICTY has been very careful in using the 
term “detainees” rather than prisoners of war. Detainees 
are not given combatant’s privilege, and thus violations 
of IHL are violations under the Fourth, rather than the 
Third, Geneva Convention. It is for similar reasons that 
the United States continues to label those captured as 
detainees. Given the ICTY’s narrow interpretation of 
prisoners of war, and the Article 5 requirement noted 
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above, the ICTY has also found that, notwithstanding the 
complexity of distinguishing between them in detention 
camps, all detainees are afforded the protection of either 
the Third or Fourth Geneva Convention in regards to 
detention. 118 Surprisingly, the court also found that 
all detainees were protected under common Article 3 
notwithstanding the requirement that those victims 
take no part in active hostilities, because the chamber 
was satisfied that “in the present case, the victims were 
all civilians or prisoners of war, and as such were not or 
no longer taking part in the hostilities.”119 In Prosecutor 
v. Naletilic, the court held that, where there is doubt 
between whether one is a prisoner of war or a civilian, 
and since the application of the regime laid out in the 
Third Geneva Convention is often more favorable to the 
accused than the protection afforded to civilian detainees 
under the Fourth Geneva Convention, it should apply 
the lower standard relating to the labor of prisoners of 
war as laid out in the Third Geneva Convention to all 
detainees (since the Fourth Convention has a higher 
standard relating to labor).120 The court stressed that 
its opinion was predicated on the view that there is 
no gap between the Third and the Fourth Geneva 
Conventions. If an individual is not entitled to the 
protections of the Third Convention as a prisoner of 
war, he or she necessarily falls within the ambit of the 
Fourth Convention, meaning that no person falls outside 
the law.121 Thus, there cannot be a ‘twilight zone’ even 
where individuals do not fit neatly into either status; at 
the very least, the lower standard must always apply to 
every person victimized by warfare.
VI. Conclusion
If torture is ever to be completely eradicated, 
all states must adhere to several international principles. 
First, where warfare begins, human rights do not end. 
The UN CAT and other international agreements do not 
simply cease in their entirety at the outbreak of warfare, 
but continue to supplement those areas of the law left 
ambiguous by the Law of Armed Conflict. Second, war 
itself must be recognized as an abhorrent practice. If 
the Geneva Conventions are always to be obeyed, the 
notion of traditional warfare cannot be derogated from if 
a state seeks to use force against any threat to its security 
or existence. Thus, traditional notions of spatiality and 
temporality must withstand the rise of new forms of 
warfare. Members of transnational terrorist groups, while 
often vicious, insidious, and in need of neutralization, 
may never make up a belligerent force with which a state 
may go to war. Thus, the full scope of human rights 
always applies to terrorists not participating directly in 
a conflict. Nonetheless, when terrorists do participate 
in armed conflicts, they do not forfeit their treatment 
as human beings. As the jurisprudence indicates, they 
are always afforded protection under either the Third or 
Fourth Geneva Conventions.
As the United States has argued, this indeed 
puts the United States, or any state combating the 
new threat of international terrorism, at a strategic 
disadvantage. However, through the adherence of such 
principles, and the respect for the founding ideologies of 
freedom and democracy, the sole path to victory against 
those who seek to destroy these values is presented. As 
one court noted, this is a plight unique to democracies; 
“not all means are acceptable to it, and not all methods 
employed by its enemies are open to it. Sometimes, a 
democracy must fight with one hand tied behind its 
back. Nonetheless, it has the upper hand. Preserving the 
rule of law constitute[s] an important component of its 
understanding of security.”122 The prohibition of torture 
is a fundamental building block of modern civilization. 
The values of this civilization should never get lost in 
the furor and rhetoric of warfare; states should therefore 
adhere to the restraints of the Geneva Conventions and 
of the UN Convention Against Torture.
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